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In this work we construct a theoretical model explaining the relation existing
between corruption, monitoring and production in an economy. By solving a
3–period dynamic game within the principal–agent scheme, we derive a func-
tion that associates to each monitoring level on the corruption implemented
by the State a unique total equilibrium output produced in the economy
under the hypothesis placed.
Several authors, like Barreto (2000), Del Monte and Papagni (2001) and
Acemoglu and Verdier (1998,2000), studied models where corruption emerges
from a market failure and found–out that the relation between corruption and
economic growth is non–linear.
Precisely, while Acemoglu and Verdier (1998,2000) determine the optimal
corruption level (due to the presence of a trade–oﬀ between a public failure
and a market one) in a wage eﬃciency model,1 Barreto (2000) showed that
corruption can be “eﬃciency enhancing” since it reduces bureaucracy inef-
ﬁciencies. Finally Del Monte and Papagni (2001) construct a model where
curruption reduces public infracstructure quality that are necessary for pro-
duction and hence it has a negative indirect impact on economic growth.
We reach similar conclusions since we derive a non–linear relation between
corruption and output and we prove that greater corruption can be associated
to greater production. Diﬀerently from the previous works, in our model
corruption is both the consequence of the low monitoring level implemented
by the State, and the existence of an entrepreneur return eventually used to
pay a bribe and, ﬁnally, the monopolistic and discretional bureaucrat power.
Diﬀerently form Barreto (2000), most economic researchers attach great
importance to corruption because of its signiﬁcant negative impact on invest-
ment. For instance Mauro (1995,1998) showed that a country that improves
its standing on corruption will experience an increase in its investment and
GDP growth rate. Furthermore Campos et al. (1999) pointed out on the pre-
dictability of corruption by showing that the negative impact of the corrup-
tion on investment is lesser for those corruption regimes that are predictable.
Our conclusions are partially diﬀerent from the previous ones since we
prove that with a low monitoring level, high corruption can lead to great
output.
The modern analysis of corruption (starting from the works by Rose–
Ackerman, 1975, 1978) places such phenomenon within a principal–agent
1See also Besley and McLaren (1993) and Van Rijckeghem and Weber (1997) who
proposed alternative bureuacrat payment schemes in the presence of corruption.
1scheme. In fact the existence of corruption is subject to an agency relation-
ship between an individual in charge of making decisions (the agent) and the
owner of the interests (principal) he represents. A third party (in this model
the entrepreneur) should then be involved to inﬂuence the agent’s discretional
decisions to his own beneﬁt, upon the payment of a bribe. Following the as-
sumption of most recent works (e. g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) the agency
relationship between the bureaucrat (agent) and the Government (principal)
will not be analyzed, but focus will only be made on the possible relation
between the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur (third party) in order to better
highlight the mechanisms through which such relations develop as well as
the eﬀects of such behaviors on the economy. In our model the State is an
external agent who controls the bureaucrats’ and entrepreneurs’ behavior by
ﬁxing the monitoring level.
Here we consider the model studied in Coppier and Piga (2004) while
assuming the more realistic hypothesis that entrepreneur can diversify pro-
duction both investing in the traditional as well as in the modern sector of
the economy. Furthermore, here we are replacing the hypothesis of constant
marginal returns to capital with the one of decreasing marginal returns to
capital in order to compare the achieved results. The approach we used
is mainly theorical: we ﬁrst formalize and solve a 3–period dynamic game
describing the model, second we ﬁnd out the equilibrium output at each sce-
nario and ﬁnally we prove the properties of the monitoring–production (MP)
function and we discuss the optimal policy conclusions. The MP function
is non–linear and upper–hemicontinuous furthermore it is decreasing for low
values of the monitoring level:2 it means that, diﬀerently from Mauro (1998),
more corruption could be associated with more production.3 In fact at low
monitoring levels the economy experiences widespread corruption associated
with greater output than the one in the case of intermediate monitoring level.
Finally only suﬃciently high monitoring level guarantees maximum produc-
tion without corruption. Consequently, since monitorning is costly, if the
State is budget constrained it may ﬁnd it convenient to accept corruption
implementing a low monitoring level and obtaining an intermediate output
level.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we ﬁrst present the model
and then we formalize and solve the dynamic game describing the model.
In Section 3 we demonstrate the non–linear relation between the monitoring
2While Coppier and Piga (2004) derived a discontinuous piecewise–constant function
since they assume a linear technology.
3The implication resulting from our model is also conﬁrmed by data for the Italian case
in the 1971-1996, see Coppier and Piga, 2004.
2level of bureaucrats by the State, corruption and equilibrium output and we
describe its properties. In Section 4 we discuss policy considerations and
we compare diﬀerent optimal policies related to the existence of a budget
constraint faced by the State. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The model.
Let us consider an economy producing a single homogeneous good. There
are two distinct categories of individuals in such an economy. First the
bureaucrats, who cannot invest in the production activity, and second the
entrepreneurs, who may invest their total capital available both in the mod-
ern sector and in the traditional one. There is a continuum of bureaucrats
and entrepreneurs and their number is normalized to one for both categories.
A third agent is the State who controls entrepreneurs’ and bureaucrats’ be-
havior in order to weed out or reduce corruption.
The production function of the tradeable good only depends on the capital
k>0 available to the entrepreneur which can be invested in the modern
sector or in the traditional one. Let kM and kT be the capital amounts
respectively invested in the modern or in the traditional sector (kM,k T ≥ 0).







where kM + kT = k (all the capital amount is invested) and 0 <β<α<1.
We assume both that α,β ∈ (0,1) because of the decreasing marginal returns
to capital hypothesis, and also that β<αsince the returns in the traditional
sector are less than the ones in the modern sector.4
The entrepreneur who wants to invest a positive capital amount kM in
the modern sector needs to obtain a licence from the bureaucrat to access the
technology. In order to obtain such a licence he has to submit a project to
the Public Administration whose cost is a proportion s>0 of the capital kM
the entrepreneur wants to invest in the modern sector, then the submission
cost is skM. We assume kα
M + k
β
T − (kT + kM)β >s k M for investment be
convenient in the modern sector.5
4In our model corruption transactions are due to the existence of a non–competitive
sector (the modern one) that generates incomes for entrepreneurs that can be used to pay




T − (kT + kM)β ≤ skM then the submission cost exceeds the return gains
between the two sectors.
3Once the entrepreneur presents the project to the bureaucrat, the latter
may decide to be honest or corrupt by issuing the licence in exchange for a
bribe.6 Let bd ≥ 0 be the bribe asked to issue the licence.7 The entrepreneur
could refuse the payment of the bribe or accept the bride asked or open a
negotiation on the bribe with the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat is assumed
to have monopolistic and discretional power, that is, he is the only one who
may issue the licence or refuse it without any explanation.
The State has a control role on the behavior of entrepreneurs and bureau-
crats. Let q ∈ [0,1] be the monitoring level implemented by the State such
that there is a probability q of being detected in an extortion. In this paper
we consider q as exogenous.
The punishment for an act of corruption is a proportional cost (monetary,
moral or criminal) of the submitted project capital amount kM both for
entrepreneur and bureaucrat as in Rose–Ackerman (1999). Let mkM be the
punishment for the detected bureaucrat and ckM the one for the detected
entrepreneur, where m,c > 0. We also assume m ≥ c since the bureaucrat
has the discretional power to demand the bribe and the monopolistic power
to issue the licence.8
The aim of this work is to determine the optimal level of invested capital
in each productive sector and the output level of the economy under corrup-
tion. In order to ﬁnd out the relation between corruption, monitoring and
output, we procede with the formalization and solution of the dynamic game
describing the model.
2.1 Dynamic game. Description and solution.
Given the model just described, the economic problem can be formalized by
the following three-period dynamic game.
(1) At stage one of the game the entrepreneur decides the capital amount
to be invested in the modern sector kM and consequently kT = k−kM.
(1.1) If kM = 0, all the capital is invested in the traditional sector.
Let W>0 be the wage for the bureaucrat, then the payoﬀ vector for
6Diﬀerently from Shleifer and Vishny (1993) in our model we assume that corruption
is without theft.
7We are assuming the bribe asked is constant and does not depend on kM. However,
it can be shown that our results would not change by placing bd = bkM,b e i n gb ≥ 0.
8As underlined in Rose–Ackerman (1999) in several countries bribe payers are treated
more leniently than recipients.
4bureaucrat and entrepreneur is
π1 =( W, (kT + kM)
β)( 2 )
being kT = k. The game ends.
(1.2) Otherwise, let kM  = 0. Then the entrepreneur submits the project
and pays the cost skM. The game continues to stage two.
(2) At stage two the bureaucrat decides the amount of the asked bribe bd
to issue the licence.
(2.1) If bd = 0 no bribe is asked, then the payoﬀ vector for bureaucrat
and entrepreneur is




T − skM)( 3 )
being kM + kT = k, kM  = 0. The game ends.
(2.2) Otherwise, let bd > 0 be the positive bribe asked by the bureau-
crat. The game continues to stage three.
(3) At stage three the entrepreneur decides whether to negotiate the bribe
or refuse it.








being kT + kM = k. Then the game ends.
(3.2) Otherwise the negotiation starts. Let bNB be the ﬁnal equilibrium
bribe associated to the Nash solution to a bargaining game9 that is
the result of the negotiation. Then, given the monitoring level on the
corruption pursued by the State q, the payoﬀ vector is
π4 =
 









being kT + kM = k, kM  = 0. The game ends.
We ﬁrst determine the equilibrium bribe bNB (see Appendix A for the
proof).
9See Binmore et al. (1986).
5Proposition 2.1. Let q  =1 .10 Then there exists a unique positive equilib-







T − (kT + kM)β + q(m − c)kM
2(1 − q)
. (6)
Notice that the entrepreneur pays half of the expected surplus11 to the
bureaucrat as a bribe.
Having determined the equilibrium bribe bNB in (6), the payoﬀ vector in
















In Appendix B we solve the dynamic game by using the backward in-































(b) if q ∈ (q2,q 1) then the payoﬀ vector is
π1 =( W, (kT + kM)
β);
(c) if q ∈ [q1,1] then the payoﬀ vector is





10If q = 1 there is no incentive for the bureaucrat to demand the bribe.
11The expected surplus is the diﬀerence between the return if investing in both sectors
net of the entrepreneur’s expected cost and plus the bureaucrat’s expected cost, if they
are both detected in an act of corruption.
6The previous proposition 2.2 shows that by the backward solution of the
dynamic game we obtain three perfect Nash equilibria in the sub-games,
depending on the parameter values, that could be summarized as follows:
• if q ∈ [0,q 2], the entrepreneur submits the project at stage one, the
bureaucrat asks for a positive bribe at stage two, and ﬁnally, at stage
three, the entrepreneur starts a negotiation that ends at the equilib-
rium bribe bNB given by (6). The game ends and the payoﬀ vector is
given by (7). This equilibrium is with corruption. In such a case the
diﬀerence in proﬁts between the modern sector and what is obtained
from the traditional sector is such as to make up for the expected cost of
one’s corruption, of the bureaucrat’s corruption and for the project sub-
mission cost. Thus the surplus to be shared between the entrepreneur
and the bureaucrat allows for a negotiation. The outcome is the bribe
corresponding to the Nash solution to a bargaining game;
• if q ∈ (q2,q 1), at stage one the entrepreneur does not submit the project.
The game ends and the payoﬀ vector is given by (2). In such a case
the entrepreneur knows that what he would obtain from submitting the
project is less than what he would obtain by investing in the traditional
sector, therefore he will not submit the project. In such a case there is
no corruption but all the entrepreneurs invest in the traditional sector;
• if q ∈ [q1,1], the entrepreneur submits the project at stage one and the
bureaucrat does not ask any positive bribe. The game ends and the
payoﬀ vector is given by (3).
3 Equilibrium output under corruption.
According to the solution of our dynamic game, we now consider the maxi-
mization problem faced by the entrepreneur in order to determine the optimal
capital level to be invested in the modern sector and in the traditional one.
To simplify the analysis, in what follows we place k = 1 so that what we
must determine are the capital shares invested in both sectors. The following
proposition states the optimal capital amount invested in the modern sector
(thus, also the amount invested in the traditional sector) corresponding to
the three regimes previously determined (see appendix C for the proof).
Proposition 3.1. Let k =1and assume 0 <q 2 and q1 < 1.
(a) If q ∈ [0,q 2] a unique equilibrium amount of capital invested in the mod-
ern sector k 
M = φ(q) exists such that φ(q) is continuous and φ (q) < 0.
7(b) If q ∈ (q2,q 1) the amount of capital invested in the modern sector is
kM =0 ,s okT =1 .
(c) If q ∈ [q1,1] the amount of capital invested in the modern sector is
k 
M ∈ (0,1),t h u sa l s ok 
T ∈ (0,1).
Notice that with widespread corruption (that is q ≤ q2) the amount of
capital invested in the modern sector is a decreasing function of the moni-
toring level while in the other cases it does not depend on the monitoring
level.
Now we want to represent the qualitative graph of the equilibrium amount
of capital invested by the entrepreneur in the modern sector, k 
M, with respect
to the monitoring level implemented by the State on corruption, q.G i v e n







φ(q) q ∈ [0,q 2]
0 q ∈ (q2,q 1)
κ ∈ (0,1) q ∈ [q1,1]
(8)
ω(q) associates a unique equilibrium k 
M ∈ [0,1] to each q ∈ [0,1].
In order to investigate the geometric properties of ω(q) note that such a
function represents the solution of the ﬁrst order condition to the maximiza-
tion problem for each of the three situations depending on the values of q
(see appendix C for the details).
More precisely, let g(kM)=αk
α−1
M −β(1−kM)β−1, γ1 = q(m+c)+2s>0
and γ2 = s>0. Then the function k 
M = ω(q) is the solution for the following
equations:
(i) g(kM)=γ1 if q ∈ [0,q 2],
(ii) kM =0i fq ∈ (q2,q 1),
(iii) g(kM)=γ2 if q ∈ [q1,1].
As we have proven in appendix C, the solution of (i) is the continuous
decreasing function k 
M = φ(q). Furthermore, if q =0w eh a v et os o l v e
g(kM)=2 γ2;l e tk 
M be the solution to such an equation; if q = q2 then
π4 = π1 so the solution of the maximization problem faced by entrepreneur
is kM =0a si n( ii). Note that ω(q) is continuous in q2.
Furthermore ω(q) is constant and equal to zero ∀q ∈ (q2,q 1) as stated in
(ii).
8Finally if q ∈ [q1,1] the solution of the equation in (iii)i sac o n s t a n tv a l u e
of kM.W ec a l ls u c hav a l u eκ; it is dependent on s. This equilibrium value
is positive, as we prove in appendix C and κ>k  
M. It is straightforward
to prove that function ω(q) is upper–hemicontinuous. In ﬁgure 1 we present






















Figure 1: (a) Solution to equations (i)a n d( iii); (b) qualitative representation of
k 
M = ω(q).
Now we may discuss the qualitative properties that the output equilibrium
level has with respect to the State monitoring. In appendix D we prove the
following proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2. Let k =1and assume 0 <q 2 and q1 < 1.
(a) If q ∈ [0,q 2] then a unique equilibrium output level y  = ψ(q) exists
such that ψ(q) ≥ 1 is continuous and ψ (q) < 0;
(b) if q ∈ (q2,q 1) then the equilibrium output level is y  =1 ;
(c) if q ∈ [q1,1] then the equilibrium output level is y  = ϕ where ϕ>1.
The function that associates the unique equilibrium output to each moni-
toring level on corruption implemented by the State is upper-hemicontinuous
and is given by the following
y




ψ(q) <ϕ q∈ [0,q 2]
1 q ∈ (q2,q 1)
ϕ>1 q ∈ [q1,1]
(9)
9We call such a function MP (monitoring–production). The qualitative graph












Figure 2: The MP-function: equilibrium production level with respect to the
monitoring of corruption.
4 Policy considerations.
Let us consider the MP function just derived. Then the State could choose to
achieve one of the following (ﬁrst) policy objectives: maximize output, weed
out corruption or minimize monitoring costs. So we analyze the following
three cases:
• if the State wants to maximize production without considering the
monitoring costs and the corruption level, it has to set the monitoring
level at q ≥ q1.N o t i c et h a t∀q ≥ q1 corruption is absent, hence, since
monitoring is expensive, the optimal policy is to set the monitoring
level at q = q1 with consequent output level being y  = ϕ>1;
• if the State wants to weed–out corruption it has to set a monitoring level
q ≥ q2 so, without corruption, only two diﬀerent equilibrium outputs
could be reached that are y  =1a n dy  = ϕ>1. If the second policy
objective is to maximize production then the State has to set q ≥ q1,
and consequently q = q1 since monitoring is expensive, so y  = ϕ>1.
If its second policy objective is to minimize monitoring costs then the
State will set q = q2 and consequently y  =1 ;
10• if the State wants to minimize monitoring costs it has to set the mon-
itoring level q = 0 and the equilibrium output that will be reached is
y  = y(k 
M) ∈ (1,ϕ); such an objective is not compatible with corrup-
tion elimination.
The previous considerations are summarized in table 1.
No budget constraint
Objectives 2nd: max production 2nd: no corruption 2nd:m i nc o s t s
1st: max production q = q1 ⇒ y  = ϕ>1 q = q1 ⇒ y  = ϕ>1 q = q1 ⇒ y  = ϕ>1
1st: no corruption q = q1 ⇒ y  = ϕ>1 q ≥ q2 ⇒ y  = {1,ϕ} q = q2 ⇒ y  =1
1st:m i nc o s t s q =0⇒ y  ∈ (1,ϕ) −−− q =0⇒ y  ∈ (1,ϕ)
Table 1: First and second policy objective and the associated monitoring
levels.
Notice that a unique optimal policy according to the MP function does
exist, having the properties “maximum production– no corruption” at the
same time, and that in order to reach such a point it needs public investment
on the struggle against corruption such that q = q1. Hence, by ﬁxing a mon-
itoring level q = q1, the State can reach its ﬁrst policy objective “maximize
production” without corruption and at minimum cost.
On the contrary, if the ﬁrst policy objective is “no corruption” then the
State cannot reach the two second objectives “minimize costs” and “maxi-
mize production” at the same time.
Finally, the unique optimal policy in order to minimize monitoring costs is
achieved by ﬁxing q = 0; this point determines the unique viable production
level with widespread corruption.
The equilibrium points just described are all viable, if and only if, the
State disposes of suﬃcient resources such that the monitoring level q = q1
can be achieved.
However monitoring is expensive. Consequently there could be diﬀerent
reasons why q = q1 would not viable. For example the State faces a budget
constraint or it prefers to spend its resources in other ways.
Let q  be the maximum monitoring level the State can implement accord-
ing to its budget constraint.
Then it is straightforward to see that if q  ≥ q1, all the equilibria illus-
trated in table 1 are viable since the constraint is not binding.
On the contrary, if q2 ≤ q  <q 1, we have the following scenario:
11• in order to maximize production the monitoring level must be set at
q = 0: at the same time costs are minimized but corruption cannot be
avoided; the equilibrium output that will be reached is y  = y(k 
M) ∈
(1,ϕ);
• in order to weed out corruption the monitoring level must be set at
q2 ≤ q ≤ q  which implies y  = 1; since production is constant through
the interval [q2,q ] and since monitoring is costly, the optimal policy is
to ﬁx q = q2;
• in order to minimize monitoring costs the monitoring level must be
set at q = 0 and the equilibrium production that will be reached is
y  = y(k 
M) ∈ (1,ϕ) with corruption.
So we can conclude that the State has only two diﬀerent viable optimal
policies as illustrated in table 2.
Budget constraint s.t. q2 ≤ q  <q 1
Objectives 2nd: max production 2nd: no corruption 2nd:m i nc o s t s
1st: max production q =0⇒ y  ∈ (1,ϕ) −−− q =0⇒ y  ∈ (1,ϕ)
1st: no corruption q = q2 ⇒ y  =1 q2 ≤ q ≤ q  ⇒ y  =1 q = q2 ⇒ y  =1
1st:m i nc o s t s q =0⇒ y  ∈ (1,ϕ) −−− q =0⇒ y  ∈ (1,ϕ)
Table 2: First and second policy objectives and the associated monitoring
level with budget constraint.
In such a case the equilibrium “maximum production– no corruption” is
not viable since the unique optimal policy is q = 0 corresponding to “max-
imum production–minimum cost” characterized by widespread corruption.
Notice that this optimal policy is symmetric since, at the same time, it is
also the solution of the policy objective “minimum cost–maximum produc-
tion”. This argument shows that if the State is not interested in weeding
out corruption then the optimal strategy is always q =0 .O t h e r w i s e ,i ft h e
ﬁrst policy objective is to avoid corruption, the optimal strategy is always
q = q2, which implies no investment in the modern sector with a consequent
minimum output level.
Finally, if q  <q 2 then the State cannot weed out corruption. Conse-
quently, the optimal policy is to set q = 0 since it minimizes monitoring
costs and maximizes production at the same time.
The ﬁrst and second policy objectives choosen by the State depend on the
weight it assigns to each of the three policy objectives we described, based
12on its cost–beneﬁt analysis. The model we construct proves that, if the State
is budget constrained, the equilibrium with corruption could be desirable as
the result of an optimal policy since it maximizes production and minimizes
costs.12
The original result of the model we studied is that there could be cases
where the State has convenience to accept corruption in order to maximize
output.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the relation existing between corruption, moni-
toring and production in an economy where entrepreneurs can invest capital
both in the traditional as well as in the modern sector considering a non–
linear technology with decreasing marginal returns.
We solved a 3–period dynamic game and we proved that equilibrium
output is a non-linear upper-hemicontinuous function (MP function) of the
monitoring level implemented by the State on the corruption presenting 3
diﬀerent equilibrium scenarios. At low monitoring levels the economy ex-
periences widespread corruption with intermediate decreasing output levels,
at intermediate monitoring levels corruption is absent but low output level
is achieved, ﬁnally at high monitoring levels no corruption occurs and high
output level is recorded.
According to the function we derived, we discussed the optimal monitor-
ing level implemented by the State in a normative perspective. By ﬁxing the
ﬁrst and second policy objectives (maximizing production, minimizing costs
and weeding out corruption, respectively), we distinguished between diﬀerent
optimal strategies depending on the existence of a budget constraint faced by
the State. In particular we proved that if the State faces a budget constraint
such that it cannot reach a suﬃcient monitoring level, then the optimal pol-
icy could be accept widespread corruption in order to maximize production
at a minimum cost.
So in our paper we assessed that, contrary to previous works (see Mauro,
1995 and Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, among others), greater production could
be associated to greater corruption so we proved that the equilibrium point
with widespread corruption can be chosen as the result of an optimal policy
implemented by the State.
12Similar conclusion in the case of asymmetry information are in Coppier and Piga
(2004) where they considered the eﬀect of a reform.
13A Appendix
Proof of proposition 2.1.
Proof. We refer to the bureaucrat payoﬀ by a superscript (1) and to the
entrepreneur payoﬀ by a superscript (2): they represent respectively the ﬁrst
and second element of the payoﬀ vector πi, i =1 ,2,3,4, placed in (2), (3),




∆ ) be the vector of the diﬀerences in the
payoﬀs between the case of agreement about the bribe (5) and that in the
case of disagreement (4) for the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur. The bribe
bNB associated to the Nash solution to a bargaining game is the solution of













M − qckM − (1 − q)b + k
β
T − (kT + kM)
β
 
that is the maximum of the product between the elements of π∆.S i n c et h e
objective function is concave with respect to b, a suﬃcient condition for b













M − qckM − (1 − q)b + k
β
T − (kT + kM)
β
 
− (−qmkM +( 1− q)b)=0⇒
k
α
M + q(m − c)kM − 2(1 − q)b + k
β







T − (kT + kM)β + q(m − c)kM
2(1 − q)
that is the unique equilibrium bribe in the last subgame, ∀q  =1 .
Since m − c ≥ 0, then bNB > 0.
B Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.2.
Proof. Backward induction method.









T −skM −qckM −(1−q)b
NB > (kT +kM)
β −skM
(see (5) and (4)) that is the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ if he negotiates is
greater then his payoﬀ if he refuses. Since under perfect information hy-
pothesis the entrepreneur knows the ﬁnal equilibrium bribe bNB,g i v e n






T − (kT + kM)
β − q(m + c)kM > 0






Notice that in order to have an admissible probability set, q1 must be
greater or equal to 0. This inequality is always veriﬁed since ∀kM,k T >







T being α>β .
Furthermore, if q1 < 1 then a probability set having a positive measure
such that the entrepreneur has no convenience to negotiate the bribe
exists. Notice that




T − (kT + kM)
β − (m + c)kM < 0.
Let q1 < 1t h e ni fq<q 1 the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe, other-
wise if q ≥ q1 he refuses the bribe.14
(2) Going up the decision-making tree, at stage two the bureaucrat decides
w h e t h e rt oa s kap o s i t i v eb r i b e .
• Let q ≥ q1 then the bureaucrat knows that the entrepreneur will
not accept any positive bribe so he will be honest and will pursue the
licence without any bribe.
• Let q<q 1 then the bureaucrat knows that if he asks a positive bribe
then the entrepreneur will accept the negotiation and the ﬁnal bribe
will be bNB given by (6). Then at stage two the bureaucrat asks a bribe





2 ⇒ W − qmkM +( 1− q)b
NB >W
13Notice that kM must be diﬀerent from 0. This condition is veriﬁed because we are
studying stage three of the game so the entrepreneur has already submitted the project
to invest a positive capital amount in the modern sector.
14Otherwise if q1 ≥ 1 then the entrepreneur always negotiates the bribe.
15(see (5) and (3)) that is the bureaucrat’s payoﬀ if asking a positive
bribe is greater than his payoﬀ if not asking the bribe. By substituting






T − (kT + kM)
β − q(m + c)kM > 0
that holds ∀q<q 1. So we can conclude that if q<q 1 then the bureau-
crat asks the bribe bNB that the entrepreneur accepts.
(1) At stage one the entrepreneur has to decide whether to present the
project.
• Let q ≥ q1 then the entrepreneur knows that if he presents a project







M − skM + k
β
T > (kT + kM)
β.
(see (3) and (2)) that is if kα
M +k
β
T −(kT +kM)β >s k M. The previous
inequality is always veriﬁed for hypothesis.
• Let q<q 1 then the entrepreneur knows that the bureaucrat will ask
the bribe bNB that he will accept. So, at stage one, he has to decide
whether to invest a positive capital amount in the modern sector. So
the entrepreneur will compare his payoﬀ whether kM =0w i t hh i sp a y o ﬀ
whether kM > 0. He will invest no capital amount in the modern sector

















T − (kT + kM)
β − q(m + c)kM ≤ 0.





T − (kT + kM)β − 2skM
(m + c)kM
= q2.
If this inequality holds, the entrepreneur will invest all his capital in
the traditional sector. Otherwise, assume q2 > 0, then if q<q 2 the
entrepreneur will invest a positive quantity in the modern sector.15 It
is straightforward to prove that q2 <q 1.
15If q2 ≤ 0 the entrepreneur will never invest in the modern sector.
16C Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
Proof. First we prove part (a). If q ∈ [0,q 2] then the payoﬀ vector is given by
(7) as we have proven in proposition 2.2 so the optimal capital amount kM
to be invested in the modern sector is given by the solution to the following






T +( kT + kM)β − q(m + c)kM − 2skM
2
subject to the restriction kT =1− kM. We substitute the boundary in the
objective function and we maximize
f(kM)=
kα
M +( 1− kM)β − q(m + c)kM − 2skM
2










M − β(1 − kM)
β−1 = q(m + c)+2 s.
Let γ1 = q(m+c)+2s>0a n dg(kM)=αk
α−1
M −β(1−kM)β−1.T h e ng(kM)
is a continuous strictly decreasing function such that lim
kM→0+ g(kM)=+ ∞
while lim
kM→1− g(kM)=−∞ so that equation g(kM)=γ1 has a unique solution
k 
M ∀γ1 such that k 
M is a decreasing function of q that is
k 
M = φ(q)a n dφ (q) < 0.
Furthermore k 
M is a maximum point since f is concave.
If q ∈ (q2,q 1) then the payoﬀ vector is given by (2) and all the capital is
invested in the traditional sector so part (b)i sp r o v e n .








subject to the restriction
kT =1− kM
17Let h(kM)=kα
M +( 1− kM)β − skM then the ﬁrst order condition, that is




M − β(1 − kM)
β−1 − s =0⇒
αk
α−1
M − β(1 − kM)
β−1 = s.
Let γ2 = s>0a n dg(kM)=αk
α−1
M − β(1 − kM)β−1 then following the same
arguments we have used to prove part (a) it is proven that a unique value
k 
M ∈ (0,1) does exist such that the payoﬀ for the entrepreneur is maximum,
∀γ2, and it does not depend on q.
D Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
Proof. We ﬁrst consider the properties of the production function. Let us
consider the production function in (1) so being kM ∈ [0,1], y(kM)=kα
M +
(1 − kM)β is such that y(0) = y(1) = 1 and y(kM) > 1,∀kM ∈ (0,1).
Furthermore y (kM)=αk
α−1
M − β(1 − kM)β−1 = g(kM) (see ﬁgure 1 (a))
so that y has a unique maximum point ¯ kM such that g(¯ kM)=0 . N o ww e
consider the three diﬀerent cases.
Case (1). Let q ∈ [0,q 2]. Then the equilibrium capital amount invested
in the modern sector is k 
M such that g(k 
M)=γ1 being γ1 > 0s ok 
M belongs
to the increasing side of y(kM) ∀q ∈ [0,q 2]. Furthermore k 
M = φ(q)i sa
decreasing function of q then y(k 
M)=y(φ(q)) is decreasing ∀q ∈ [0,q 2].
Notice that the equilibrium amount of capital invested in the modern sector
without corruption, given by g(k 
M) = 0, is bigger than the one in the case
of corruption.
Case (2). Let q ∈ (q2,q 1). Then kM = 0 and the production equilibrium
level is y(0) = 1.
Case (3). Let q ∈ [q1,1]. Then the production equilibrium level is ϕ =
y(κ) such that ϕ>y (k 
M)s i n c eκ>k  
M and also g(κ) > 0.
Function y(q)=y(ψ(q)) is upper–hemicontinuous since it is the composi-
tion between a continuous function and an upper–hemicontinuous function.
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